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EPITAPH FOR PARDON BASED ON THE PURPOSE OF PUNISHMENT
Eoa CarracedoCarrasco'
A.

INTRODUCTION. CONCEPTUAL

DELINEATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARDON

The objective of this article is to analyze
the purposes assigned to "the pardon" as an institution based on the different theories of justification of punishment. Its ultimate goal is to
reflect on its justification in modern criminal
law in the framework of democratic rule of law.
To do this, it is necessary to start with the concept of the individual pardon.
In general terms, "pardon" could be defined as a discretionary act that, for a specific
case, involves the mitigation or elimination of

unfavorable legal consequences meted out in
accordance with the law.2

ister of Justice and following the deliberation
of the Council of Ministers. In application, the
sentence already imposed in a final judgment
is not fully enforced, with it being partially or
totally reduced or commuted to a less serious
one.s

A pardon entails that, at the discretion
of the Executive, a penalty is either partially
or totally not enforced according to the extension established by the Royal Decree; or it is
replaced with a lesser one.6

B. PURPOSES

ASSIGNED TO THE INSTITUTION

OF THE PARDON: INTRODUCTION.
REGUIATIVE AND PRACTICAL CONTEXT OF
THE PARDON'S ROYAL DECREES

In the face of the silence maintained by

the Spanish Constitution and legislation, "individual pardon" can be defined as the discretionary act derived from the power nominally
conferred to the Head of State.3 The pardon

power was materialized as an act of the Government, endorsed and proposed by the Min-

Not only does the Spanish Constitution
not define the particularpardon, but, as is often
the case in comparative law, neither is there an
indication of the reasons, requirements or requisites for it to be granted.

Postdoctoral researcher in Criminal Law and PhD in Law and Political Science, Universidad Aut6noma de Madrid (Spain).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; C.E., B.O.E. n. 62(i), Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
CESAR AGUADO RENEDO, Problemasconstitucionalesde la potestad de gracia: en particular su control [Constitutional challenges of the power to pardon: particularly, its control], in LA DEMOCRACIA CONSTITUCIONAL: ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR
FRANCISCO RUBIO LLORENTE [Constitutional democracy: in homage to professor Francisco Rubio Llorente] 908 (Reyes et al. eds.

2002); ROSARIO GARCIA

MAHAMUT, EL INDULTO:

UN ANALISIS

JURIDICO-CONSTITUCIONAL [THE PARDON:

A JURIDICAL-CONSTITUTIONAL

ANALYSIS] 127-48, 149 (2004).

1

Ley de 18 de junio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de la Gracia de indulto, arts. 21-23 (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain). See

also ROSARIO

GARCIA MAHAMUT, SEIS REFLEXIONES SOBRE EL INDULTO Y UNA CONSIDERACION ACERCA DE LA SUSPENSION DE LA EJECUCION

DE LA PENA ANTE LA SOLICITUD DE INDULTO [SIX REFLECTIONS ON PARDON AND A CONSIDERATION ABOUT THE SUSPENSION OF IMPRISONMENT
WHEN PARDON IS REQUESTED],

in

CONSTITUCION, ESTADO DE LAS AUTONOMiAS Y JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL [CONSTITUTION, STATE OF AUTON-

612-13 (Luis Aguiar de Luque,Valencia, ed., 2005); Juan Luis P6rez Francesch & Fernando
Dominguez Garcia, El indulto como acto del Gobierno: una perspectiva constitucional[Pardonas a Government act: a constituOMIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE]

tionalperspective], 53 REVISTA DE DERECHO POLITICO [POLITICAL LAW REVIEW] 25, 30 (2002).
Ley de 18 de junio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de la Gracia de indulto, art. 4 (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain).
6 Ley de 18 de junio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de la Gracia de indulto, arts. 4, 12, 30 (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain).
See generally C.E., B.O.E., Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
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The Law of June 18, 1870 (hereinafter
"LI"),8 when establishing rules for the exercise
of a pardon -except for the general mention of
achieving of justice, equity, or utility or public
convenience in Articles 2.3, 11, and 16-does
not determine the catalogue of reasons that
justify its granting, nor does it reveal the conditions that the subject must meet to obtain it.9

so that he or she may be eligible to receive an
individual pardon, as an extraordinary prison
benefit.1 2 Given its specific configuration as a
prison benefit, its motives cannot be based on
the totality of pardons granted in practice."
The guidelines referred to are exclusively focused on the post-conviction behavior of the
offender, with respect to serving his sentence.14

In contrast to the silence guarded by
the LI, the Spanish Criminal Code (hereinafter
"CP") points to a function that the granting of
a pardon should be directed towards, when the
controversial CP Article 4.3 provides the option for the Judge or Court to address the Government to grant it, if the rigorous application
of the provisions of the Act results in an action
or omission being punished that, in its opinion,
should not be, or if the penalty is noticeably

On the other hand, resolutions granting
pardon traditionally obey a stereotypical model in which reference to the concurrence of
"reasonsofjustice and equity" is repeated.'" They

excessive.10

Additionally, Article 206 the Prison Regulation Royal Decree ("RP")" refers to the specific conditions that the prisoner must meet
I Ley de 18 dejunio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de
la Gracia de indulto (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain).
I FERNANDO MOLINA FERNANDEZ & LAURA POZUELO PEREZ,
EXTINCION DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL Y SUS EFECTOS [EXTINCTION OF THE PENAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS EFFECTS], in MEMENTO

§ 6587 (2017) (Fernando Molina Fernhndez, ed., 2016); Francesc de Carreras, Ellndulto en Nuestro
Estado de Derecho, EL PAIS, Dec. 12, 2000, https://elpais.com/
diario/2000/12/12/espana/976575627_850215.html; JERONIPRACTICO PENAL 717

Mo GARCIA SAN MARTIN, EL INDULTO: TRATAMIENTO Y CONTROL
JURISDICCIONAL: CON FORMULARIOS [THE PARDON: TREATMENT

& JURISDICTIONAL CONTROL: WITH APPLICATIONS] 75-76 (2d ed.
2015).
10 C.P. art. 4.3 (B.O.E. 1995, 281) (Spain).
" "The Assessment Board, on a proposal from the technical
team, may request the Prison Supervision Court, the consid-

eration of clemency, to the extent that circumstances may
require, for inmates in which the following requirements on
a long-term basis are met -for at least two years and in an
extraordinary degree: a) Good behavior; b) Performance of
a regular working activity (within the prison or outside, if it
can be considered as useful to his/her future life in freedom; c)
Participation in reeducation and social reintegration activities." Reglamento Penitenciario art. 206 (B.O.E. 1996, 40)

(Spain).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol4/iss6/2
8

Washington College of Law

Spring 2019

do not explain why a decision has been made,

whether positive or a denial, because they are
used for the most heterogeneous purposes. 6
In accordance to what has been stated,
it can be concluded that we are in an area that
lacks regulation guidelines, except those inIn order to access the possibility of obtaining that prison
benefit, the convicted person must show, for more than two
years and in an extraordinary way, good behavior, performance of a normal work activity that helps him prepare for
life on the outside and participate in re-education and social
reinsertion activities. Beneficio Penitenciariode Indulto
Particular,Instrucci6n 17/2007 (Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinafter
"instrucci6n 17/2007]. See also Maria del Puerto Solar Calvo,
El Indulto: Una PerspectivaPenitenciara,LEGAL TODAY, July
31, 2014, http://www.legaltoday.com/practica-juridica/penal/
penal/el-indulto-una-perspectiva-penitenciaria; MARIA JESUS
ESPUNY & OLGA PAZ TORRES, 30 ATOS DE LA LEY DE AmNiSTIA
(1977-2007) [30 YEARS OF THE AMNESTY LAW (1977-2007)]
238, 243 (2009).
13 Puerto Solar Calvo, supra note 12; JESUS ESPUNY, supra
note 12, at 238, 243.
1 Instruccion 17/2007, supra note 12.
* See, e.g., Real Decreto 52/2019, de 8 de febrero, por el que
se indulta a don Luis Alberto Gonzhlez Sanz (B.O.E. 2019,
36) (Spain); Real Decreto 35/2019, de 25 de enero, por el que
se indulta a don Antonio Jos6 Vizcaino Peralbo (B.O.E. 2019,
24) (Spain).
12

16

ANA DEL PINO

CARAZO,

PROBLEMAS CONSTITUCIONALES DEL

37 (2001);
Enrique Linde Paniagua, El indulto como acto de administraci6n de justiciay su judicializaci6n. Problemas, limites y
consecuencias [Pardon as an act of administrationofjustice
and itsjudicialization:Problems, limits, and consequences],
5 TEORIA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
AND REALITY] 161, 163 (2000).
EJERCICIO DE LA POTESTAD DE CESAR AGUADO RENEDO

2
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cluded in the Spanish Criminal Code Article
4.3 and Article 206 of the RP. It is the academic opinion which has tried to fill this gap, inquiring about the reasons that lead to a pardon
being granted" without prejudice to those ju-

Practitioner

dicial resolutions that tangentially address the
issue.

C.

PURPOSES ASSIGNED TO THE INSTITUTION
OF THE PARDON IN RELATION TO THE

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT: STARTING POINTS
" See Pedro Annengol y Comet, Estudiospenitenciarios. La graciade indulto y su ejercicio [Penitentiarystudies:

The grace ofpardon and its exercise], in LA
SOCIEDAD [THE DEFENSE OF SOCIETY]

87 (Nabu Press rev. ed.

2012) (1875); see generallyHANSGEORG
LEMKE, GNADENRECHT [CLEMENCY]

DEFENSA DE LA

BIRKOFF

&

80-82 (2012);

MICHAEL

KATHRIN

BLAICH, SYSTEM UND RECHTSSTAATLICHE AUSGESTALTUNG DES
GNADENRECHTS [SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR THE

185-202 (2012); DON EMILIO BRAVO, LA
GRACIA DE INDULTO [THE GRACE OF PARDON] 197, 198 (Madrid, 1889); FERNANDO CADALSo, LA LIBERTAD CONDICIONAL, EL
RIGHT OF PARDONS]

INDULTO Y LA AMNISTIA [CONDITIONAL FREEDOM, PARDON AND
AMNESTY]

206-07 (1921);

DIMITRI DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG

IN VERGLEICHENDER PERSPEKTIVE: RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHE, VERFASSUNGS- UND STRAFRECHTLICHE PROBLEME (STRAFRECHTLICHE
ABHANDLUNGEN)

[COMPETITION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES:

LEGAL PHILOSOPHICS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL PROBLEMS
(CRIMINAL ACTS)]

341-45 (1996);

ROSARIO GARCIA

MAHAMUT,

EL INDULTO: UN ANALYSIS JURIDICO- CONSTITUCIONAL [THE PAR-

A JURIDICAL-CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS] 120-21 (2004);
Ireneo Herrero Bernab6, El derecho de gracia: indultos, 13347 (2012) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Universidad Nacional
De Educaci6n A Distancia), http://e-spacio.uned.es/fez/eserv/
DON:

tesisuned:Derecho-Iherrero/Documento.pdf; HANS-HEINRICH
JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLGEMEINER TEIL [TEXTBOOK OF OF CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL
PART] 923-24 (5th ed. 1996); Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clemency Decisionsbe Subject to a Reasons Requirement?, 13
FED. SENT'G REP. 150, 150 (2001); Jost LLORCA ORTEGA, LA
LEY DE INDULTO: COMENTARIOS, JURISPRUDENCIA, FORMULARIOS Y
NOTAS PARA

Su REFORMA

[THE LAW OF PARDONS: COMMENTARY,

75-114 (3rd
ed. 2003); Antonio Madrid P6rez, El indulto como excepci6n.
An6lisis de los indultos concedidospor el Gobierno espaihol
durante 2012 [Pardon as Exception: Analysis of Clemencies
Grantedby the Spanish Government in 2012], 6 REVISTA
JURISPRUDENCE, FORMS AND NOTES FOR ITS REFORM]

CRITICA PENAL Y PODER [CRIMINAL REVIEW PENAL AND POWER]

110, 110, 113, 115-16 (2014);
ALLGEMEINER TEIL. TEILBAND

HEINZ ZIPF ET AL., STRAFRECHT

2:

ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DES

VERBRECHENS UND RECHTSFOLGEN DER TAT [SECTION ON GENERAL
CRIMINAL LAW. SUB-CHAPTER
CONSEQUENCES] 1001-03

2:

FORMS OF CRIMES AND LEGAL

(8th ed. 2014);

AXEL

MAURER,

DAS

BEGNADIGUNGSRECHT IM MODERNEN VERFASSUNGS- UND KRIMINALRECHT [THE PARDON IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL
LAW]

47-48 (1979);

SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF,

UBER

DIE PFLICHT

DES MENSCHEN UND DES BURGERS NACH DEM GESETZ DER NATUR
[ABOUT THE DUTY OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN ACCORDING TO THE
LAW OF NATURE]

193-94 (Klaus Luig ed. & trans., 1994);

Stefan Ulrich Pieper, Das Gnadenrechtdes Bundesprcisidenten

Before we begin analyzing the purposes
assigned to the institution of the pardon by the
different theories of punishment, we must stop
to clarify a premise that is assumed to avoid
contaminating the examination of the different
scenarios. From now on, we will try to distinguish between normal scenarios and those of
an urgent nature - likened to Kantian'" states
of necessity - installed in the processes of transitional justice.19
Once such distinction is that the basis
for the granting of a pardon does not have to be
related to the purpose of the sentence. In some
types of cases, the granting of pardon ends up
being separated from the purposes assigned to
the penalty and their fulfilment; it responds to

- eine Bestandsaufrahme[The PardonPower of the Federalist President],in GNADE VOR RECHT-GNADE DURCH RECHT?
[PARDON BEFORE LAW - PARDON THROUGH LAW?]

101-05, 109

(Christian Waldhoff ed., 2014); Hinrich Rfiping, Die Gnade im
Rechstsstaat[Grace in the Law], in FESTSCHRIFT FOR FRIEDRICH
SCHAFFSTEIN [COMMEMMORATIVE FOR FRIEDRICH SCHAFFSTEIN]

36-41 (Gerald Grtinwald et al. eds., 1975); Johann-Georg
Schittzler, Gnade vor Recht [GraceBefore Right], 28 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1249, 1250-52 (1975); Leslie
Sebba, Clemency in Perspective, in CRIMINOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ISRAEL DRAPKIN 228-33 (Simha F.
Landau & Leslie Sebba eds.,1977); Luis SILVELA, EL DERECHO
PENAL ESTUDIADO EN PRINCIPIOS Y EN LA LEGISLACION VIGENTE
EN ESPAIA [CRIMINAL LAW STUDIED IN PRINCIPLES AND IN THE

434-35 (1879); Jost
& MANUEL COBO DEL RoSAL,
AND AMNESTIES] 25, 268 (1980).

CURRENT LEGISLATION IN SPAIN]

ENRIQUE

SOBREMONTE MARTINEZ

INDULTOS Y

AMNISTIA [PARDONS
1

IMMANUEL

KANT, DIE METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN, IN ZWEY THEI-

LEN [THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, IN Two PARTS]

ed. 1803).
19 See ALICIA GL GL

ET AL., COLOMBIA

CoMo

231-32 (2d

NUEVO MODELO

PARA LA JUSTICIA DE TRANSICION [COLOMIA AS A NEW MODEL
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2018
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other exogenous reasons. 20 For example, the pardon granted to solve a situation of economically unsustainable prison overcrowding or to celebrate commemorative events. 2 ' The proposed
analysis concentrates on the first group, the
normal scenarios, and examines the different
purposes assigned to pardon to justify its use

based on the different theories of punishment.
Finally, the following analysis may be
transferred mutatis mutandis to mixed, unified,
or unifying constructions of punishment, insofar as they are based on or are composed of
the abstractions and premises that will be analyzed without deeming a specific study necessary. Such a study, in this regard, would not add
anything to the constructions of punishment.

C.1. How the pardon fits into
absolute theories

However, Kant also contemplated an
exception, structured as a state of necessity.2 5
To construct his exception, it is illustrative that
Kant resorted to the crime of rebellion, inspired by what took place in Scotland in 1745.
Kant observes that, if the number of accomplices of such action was so great that the state
almost reaches the point of having no subjects
and did not want to be dissolved by returning
to the state of nature, the sovereign would have
power, in that extreme case (casus necessitatis),
to judge and deliver a judgement imposing another penalty on criminals instead of the death
penalty, in order to preserve the life of the people as a whole.2 6
At the heart of absolute theories, therefore, resorting to pardon is eventually defended. The question that continuously arises is: in
which cases is its use advocated?
i) In exceptional circumstances, like
those Kant would assume, those theories allow a relaxation of his postulates and accept the possibility of
employing pardon.2 7

It might seem counterintuitive that theories based on retributive premises could make
room for the pardon. The often-mentioned
Kantian example of the inhabitants of the island quickly comes to mind.2 2 Kant argued
that, even when the risk of a civil society being
dissolved exists, the last remaining murderer
in prison would have to be executed first, so
that each has done to him what his actions deserve. 23 If society does not demand the punishment, then society is responsible for the public
violation of justice. 2 4

ii) In scenarios considered as normal:

(a) The arguments used to defend
the pardon are not specific to the
absolute theories nor do they surJUSTICE AND ITS LIMITS]

75 76 (2007); DIMOULIs,

DIE BEGNADI-

GUNG, supra note 17, at 595.
21 See Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On

Eva Carracedo Carrasco, Pena e indulto: una aproximaci6n holistica [Punishment andpardon: a holistic ap20

proach] 296-333 (2018).
21
Id. at 242-48, 280-89.
22

KANT, supra note 18, at 231 32.

23

Id.

24

Id.; NORBERT

CAMPAGNA, STRAFRECHT UND UNBESTRAFTE

STRAFTATEN: PHILOSOPHISCHE

UBERLEGUNGEN

ZUR STRAFENDEN

Moral JustificationofExecutive Clemency, 9 BUFF. L. REV.
101, 109-10 (2005) (noting that Kant believed that the state
retains a right of necessity to grant clemency in extreme situations).
26 See KANT, supra note 18, at 231-32, (explaining that the
sovereign would not implement this decision by means of a
public law, but through an act of authority, as an act of the law
of majesty that, as a pardon, can only be exercised in isolated
cases); VON PUFENDORF, supra note 17, at 194.
21

KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE,

GERECHTIGKEIT UND IHREN GRENZEN [CRIMINAL LAW AND UN-

PUBLIC INTEREST

STATED DISPUTES: PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CRIMINAL

(1989).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol4/iss6/2
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MERCY & THE
164, 201-02 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997)
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pass the premises on which they
are based2 8 (making use of reasons
such as offender rehabilitation or
the achievement of heroic merits
and services)29 and, consequently,
they will be analyzed later; or
(b) They defend the granting of forgiveness in favor of amnesty (like
Hegel)so or the forgiveness of the
victim,3 '

not the pardon 3 2 and,

Practitioner

I

of just desserts as a metaconcept

stand out34 : in the same way as

the offender deserves the punishment, he may gain the benefit of
pardon.

In both scenarios of justified pardons
(c.1 and c.2), the application of the pardon has
now been surpassed by more precise institutions, through the adequate application of the
legal theory of crime developed in our legal

therefore, outside the scope of
our analysis; or

system and due to fundamental premises of

(c) They are justified: (c. 1.) when
the expiatory purpose or moral
reform of the convict has been
completed earlier or (c. 2.) when
based on moral or legal just desserts, the act of the pardon intends to replace deficiencies or
correct dysfunctions that are observed when assuming the said
premises. 33 In this regard, the
constructions based on the idea

When it is a matter of resolving the anticipated fulfilment of the expiatory purpose
assigned to the punishment, there are already
mechanisms designed to adapt the prison regime applicable to the subject who shows good
behavior, who is already "reformed," as well as
legal solutions that allow early release, an effective shortening of the time that he is deprived

Clifford Dome & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of
RetributiveJustice: Interpretationsfrom a National Survey of
Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 413, 450 (2007); Heidi M. Hurd, The Morality of
Mercy, OHIO STATE J. OF CRIM. LAW 389, 417 (2007); Morison,

our rule of law.3

of his liberty.3 ' Therefore, a pardon would be

overcome by the current gradual prison regime
(including parole)38 and the prison benefit of
granting parole in advance. 39

28

3

supra note 25, at 112.
supra note 27, 197; Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation ofExecutive Clemency,
74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1501, 1523-31 (2000).
29

MOORE,

30

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER

PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS: NATURRECHT UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
vi GRUNDRISSE [BASICS OF PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS: NATURAL LAW
AND STATE SCIENCE IN AN OUTLINE] 293-94 § 282 (1821).
1 See KANT, supra note 18, at 236 (explaining his theory in

relation to crimes of lese majesty).
32

See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 28, at 392-93, 417.
MOORE, supra note 27, at 10; Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81
PHIL. REV. 182, 184-89, 204-06 (1972); Dome, supra note
28, at 413, 421; Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1421, 1471-73 (2004); (defending the redirection to legislation and not to pardon); Tara Smith, Tolerance & Forgiveness:
Virtues or Vices?, 14 J. APPLIED PHIL. 31, 39-40 (1997).
31 Markel, supra note 35, at 1425-78; Rapaport, supra note
29, at 1501-02.
3

3

KARL DAVID AUGUST RODER, DIE HERRSCHENDEN GRUNDLEH-

REN VON VERBRECHEN UND STRAFE IN IHREN INNEREN WIDER-

HEINZ ZIPF ET AL., STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL. TEILBAND

SPRUCHEN [THE INITIAL BASICS OF CRIMINAL AND PENALTY IN

104-05, 127-28 (1867).
supra note 17, at 206; Markel, supra note 35, at

2: ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DES VERBRECHENS UND RECHTSFOLGEN

THEIR INNER CONFLICTS]

DER TAT [CRIMINAL LAW GENERAL PART. PART 2: APPEARANCE OF

38

THE CRIMINAL AND LEGAL ACTIONS OF THE ACT]

135-36 (2014).

* Hugo Adam Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the Pardoning Power, 27, U. RICH. L. REV. 185, 189 (1992); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, 4, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1, 7,

CADALSo,

1468-69.
Reglamento Penitenciario arts. 202.2, 205 (B.O.E. 1996,
40) (Spain). Nothing could prevent the incorporation of the
scenario of article 206 in the regime provided for in the preceding provision.
3

9 (1986).
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2018
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vidualization in the gradual enforcement of the
sentence which, could even be suspended.4
If the sentencing court noticed the im-

-

If the argument used at the heart of
absolute theories is constructed based on the
rule of behavior - that an act should no longer
be subject to blame or criminal punishment
then the act no longer necessarily needs to be
addressed as a statutory offence. Therefore, the
use of pardon has been replaced by legislative
reform and by the subsequent revision of the
judgements.

'

Criminal Law PractitionerCriminal

If the point is to adjust the application
of the general rule to the particularities of the
specific case, which is assumed as the cornerstone of the issue, then there are currently
sufficient mechanisms available to achieve the
necessary individualization and adjustment
without resorting to pardons. The Judges implement the individualization and determination of the penalty, in accordance with the
guidelines (adaptable) set by the legislator. This
task of individualization is not limited to the
sentencing phase, but also, once the judgement
is passed and a specific penalty is imposed,
all the pre-established measures in the prison
regulations are deployed to carry out said indi-

Daniel T. Kobil, Quality ofMercy Strained: Wresting the
PardoningPowerfrom the King, 69 TEX. L. REv. 569, 627-30
(1991).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol4/iss6/2
40
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therefore, a question of unconstitutionality 42

could be raised and, additionally, a request for
the repeal or modification of criminal legal
provisions.43

Curiously, the absolute theories would
also try to solve, through the pardon, the dispro
portion of the imposed punishment when the
prisoners personal circumstances changed.
In those cases, the solution lies with, as already
settled by our legislator, allowing that adjustment ex ante, incorporating legal provisions
(suspension of imprisonment, access to parole
or the progression through the prison system)
that include those cases that are deemed relevant (qualified medical conditions or advanced
-

Another main use for those who defend
resorting to pardon within these theories, is to
solve proportionality deficiencies that would
result in the application of excessive penalties. In this area, the use of that institution is
intended to solve malfunctions of the rule in
the abstract, and to correct the punitive excess
that the application of the rule to a specific case
may generate. If the deficiency refers to the rule
in the abstract, then there is no solution other
than legal reform and, once again, a revision of
the judgements passed under the previous and
more burdensome regulatory regime.4 0

possibility of reaching a solution that was
proportional to the specific case, then the deficiency would reside not in the individualization process, but in the rule to be applied and,

aging). 4
Finally, it is observed how the defenders
of retribution theories would have structured
the pardon as a mechanism to correct the deficiencies in the application of the deserved

C.P. (B.O.E. 1995, 281) (Spain).
4 The result of which could be the interpretation according to
the Constitution of the challenged precept. Enrique Bacigalupo
Zapater, La RigurosaAplicacionde la Ley [The StrictAppli41

cation of the Law], 48 ANUARIO DE DERECHO PENAL Y CIENCIAS

[YB. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIM. Sci.] 862 (1995); Javier
Shnchez-Vera G6mez-Trelles, Una lectura criticade la Ley
de Indulto [A CriticalReview ofPardon Law], 2 INDRET 1,
12-13, 17-18 (2008).
41
SILVELA, supra note 17, at 436-37 (noting that repeal or
modification that could be implemented not only at the initiative of the sentencing court, but also in accordance with the
specific mechanisms established in the Spanish Constitution).
4
Markel, supra note 35, at 1470-7 1.
4
C.P. art. 92(3) (B.O.E. 1995, 281) (Spain).
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punishment. The catalogue of scenarios that
are raised is broad. 46
In fact, this body of reasons is so vast because, in practice, it is projected on all those cases that lend to the construction of the criminal
theory (the validity of the rule of behavior and
the rule of punishment being assumed). In the
end, the reasons would allow the conclusion of
the inexistence of a criminal act committed by
a subject to whom criminal responsibility can
be demanded. Not because the act is made to
fictitiously disappear, but because, more than
anything, it cannot be considered criminal47 (or
the act does not exist, it is not statutorily defined, it is not unlawful, it is not culpable, or it
is not punishable) .4 The application of criminal theory to these cases makes it unnecessary
and inadmissible to resort to the institution of
the pardon to resolve an issue that the application of justice itself solves.

Practitioner

I

would not be sufficient, it being essential that
the threatened evil be applied as soon as the offense was determined. For the threat contained
in the law to be real, it must truly imply the real

imposition of an evil.49
It seems to be confirmed then that, in
general, at the heart of these constructions,

there would be a shielded opposition to the use
of pardons and forgiveness. 5 0 However, Feuerbach himself made exceptions to his general

opposition, based on the indifference of the
application of pardons for the purpose of de-

terrence in cases where judgments are considered unjust or perceived as such.
The reasons that justify resorting to pardons, in accordance with the arguments used
by Feuerbach5 ' and Mittermaier,52 can be arranged into two categories: (i) the arguments

used within normal contexts; and (ii) the reasons referring to extraordinary contexts, in

C.2. How the pardon fits into the
general prevention theories
C2.1. Pardonand negautive general
prevention theory

which its use serves to maintain the legal state
against pressing dangers (for example, conspiracies).53
In normal scenarios, the reasons can be
divided, in turn, into three subgroups:

It seems that negative general prevention theories would not find space for pardons.
The father of the psychological coercion theory, Feuerbach, assumed that the legal threat
See Ross Harrison, The Equality ofMercy, in JURISPRUDENCE, CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 119 (Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison
eds., 1992); MOORE, supra note 27, passim; James Barnett, The
GroundsofPardon, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490, 502-03,
511-12, 515-16 (1927); Kobil, supra note 40, at 630-32;
Morison, supra note 25, at 25; Nigel Walker, The Quiddity of
Mercy, 70 PHL. 27, 33-34 (1995).
4 Markel, supra note 35, at 1455.
48 Hugo A. Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the Pardoning
Power, 27 U. RICH. L REV. 185, 194 (1993) ("We cannot infer
from the fact that a given offender does not 'deserve' a given
sentence, that the offender does 'deserve' the mercy that a pardon brings. For it may be that the offender does not 'deserve'
anything at all[.]") (emphases in original).
46

[1] The cases in which, although the sentence cannot be regarded as ajudicial
error subject to review, it provokes a
public outcry. The scenarios in which
"

PAUL JOHANN ANSELM VON FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES GE-

MEINEN IN DEUTSCHLAND GULTIGEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS [TEXTBOOK
OF THE COMMUNITY IN GERMANY VALID PERMANENT RIGHTS]

38-40 (Giessen, Heyer, 1847);

PAUL JOHANN ANSELM VON

FEUERBACH , REVISION DER GRUNDSATZE UND GRUNDBEGRIFFE
DES POSITIVEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS [REVISION OF THE PRINCIPLES
AND BASIC CONCEPTS OF POSITIVE PUBLIC LAW]

48-51 (Erfurt,

Henning, 1799).
50

DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG,

FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS

51

supra note 17, at 596; MARK

21 (2009).

supra note 49, at 120-21; FEUERsupra note 49, at xxvii-xxviii.
LEHRBUCH, supra note 49, at 122, notes II to IV

FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH,

BACH, REVISION,
FEUERBACH,

Id. at 121.
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this aversion could arise, are identified as those cases in which material
justice would not correspond to legal
justice, at the time it was applied by
the sentencing court:

to apply the law. 5 9 A pardon would

serve to correct the severity of the
law that has become cruel, allowing it to maintain the dissuasive
authority of the law when faced
with the risk of provoking moral
repugnance or indifference. 6 0

(a) Due to a temporary lack of adaptation: Cases where society has
evolved in some way that legal
texts have not been capable of

(c) Because the delivery of a judgement goes against the principle of
equality, by breaking away from
the normal repressive practice.'

keeping up with.54 For example,

those cases in which a certain
conduct should no longer be
considered as criminal (or should

[2] Cases in which the sentencing judgment does not cause an outcry, its
enforcement can be disapproved of,
and a pardon would be innocuous to
the punishment's deterrence effect.
Its granting is recognized as a reward
for the offender's good behavior
from perspectives similar to those of
special prevention. 6 2

not be so severely punished5 5 ),

but the legal text has not yet been
repealed or modified. 6

(b) To cover an area that neither the
judicial power, given its constrictions, 57 nor the legislative power
reach.58

There are the scenarios

in which, considering the special
circumstances of the case and
given the express wording of the
law, the adjudicating body must
be subjected to an asymmetry between formal justice and material justice occurs again. This time
not because the legal text is disproportionate in the abstract, but
because of the idiosyncrasy of the
case that is pending before the
Court, which is limited by its duty

'

[3] As a reward mechanism that encourages collaboration with justice, promising impunity to gang members or
participants in collective actions who
inform on fellow members. 3
Once those cases are identified where
resorting to pardon is justified, based on the
negative general deterrence theory, the following is observed:
i) In exceptional scenarios, the negative general prevention theories expressly allow for the use of a pardon,
when, ordinary means for overcoming these exceptional circumstances
are expected to fail.

ANTONIO BERISTAIN IPINA, UN DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL DE LA

PERSONA TODAVIA NO SUFICIENTEMENTE RECONOCIDO: EL DERECHO AL PERDON

[A

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE PERSON STILL

NOT SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNIZED: THE RIGHT TO PARDON]

22 (1985-

1986).
"

VITTORIO EMANUELE ORLANDO, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTO COSTI-

TUZIONALE [PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUIONAL LAW]

220 § 287 (5th

ed. 1920).
6 FEUERBACH, REVISION,

supra note 49, at xxviii.

Id. at xxvii-xxix.

Washington College of Law

FEUERBACH, REVISION, supra note

60

FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH, supra note

61

DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 455-59.
FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH, supra note 49, at 122, note IV
Id. at 121 § 63.

62

supra note 49, at 121.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol4/iss6/2
FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH,

14

1'
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ii)

However, as Feuerbach himself anticipated , the solutions regarding normal scenarios can be found in other
ordinary mechanisms of the criminal
system.

If the text of the law has become obsolete, nothing prevents its reform; both in terms
of adapting social consideration with respect to
the rule of behavior, and adjusting the quantum
of the penalty that would be imposed on a specific crime by minimizing it.65 This would allow
judgements delivered under the previous and
more burdensome regime to be reviewed.
If the point is to adjust the ideal of materialjustice to a specific case that presents particular circumstances, to solve a deficiency in
terms of individualization when applying the
rule, Feuerbach himself admits the possibility
of defending an alternative in which it is accepted that the adjudicating body is able to resolve said mismatch through the interpretation
and application of the rule. 6
Although Mittermaier himself had already announced the controversy and difficulties of resorting to pardon regarding this
specific justification, if the intention was to
acknowledge a reward for the convicts, as an incentive to leave prison early, other institutions
have far exceeded its use. Mittermaier himself
did not discard the possibility of making use of
the institution of the indeterminate judgement
as a mechanism to value not only the necessary
reparations of the harm caused by the crime
and the protection of society, but also reform

of the offender.6

1

Practitioner

Consequently, the use of par-

dons would be relieved by a gradual prison regime (including parole) and the prison benefit
of granting parole in advance.
Finally, as Bacigalupo Zapater pointed out, resorting to pardons to incentivize the
collaboration with justice would have been replaced by an express regulation to that effect,
so that the institution of the pardon would
have become, from this perspective as well, superfluous.

69

C2.2. PardonandpositiVegeneral
prevention theory
Primafacie, it seems again that there is
no room for pardon within the positive general prevention theories. However, Jakobs himself who, let's recall, demands the affliction of
criminal pain) or authors who advocate for idealistic foundations of punishment within those
constructions, recognize the possibility of resorting to the said institution.70 In this regard,
it is noteworthy that Silva Sanchez has already
pointed out that "positive generalprevention is
surely the foundation of forgiveness in criminal
law."7 ' So, the questions that arise are, in which
cases and under what conditions?
Within the positive general prevention
theory, I will highlight the constructions elaborated by Jakobs himself and by Dimoulis.

Notes on Current and Recent Events., 3 J. Am. Inst. Crim.
L. & Criminology 266, 303-05 (1912).
68

69

ENRIQUE BACIGALUPO ZAPATER, DERECHO PENAL Y EL ESTADO

DE DERECHO [CRIMINAL LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW] 23 (2005).

64

FEUERBACH, REVISION,

66

ENRIQUE BACIGALUPO ZAPATER, JUSTICIA PENAL Y DERECHOS

supra note 49, at xxvii-xxix.

FUNDAMENTALES [CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS]

20-22 (2002); ENRIQUE LINDE PANIAGUA, AmNiSTIA E INDULTO EN
ESPAIA [AMNESTY AND PARDON IN SPAIN] 43 (1976).
66 FEUERBACH, REVISION, supra note 49, at xxvii-xxix.

10 For the purpose of this study, theories considering forgiveness as a functional equivalent of punishment are excluded
because, despite their suggestion, they do not determine in
what specific assumptions that interchangeability would be
acceptable, arguing for the unpredictability of the granting as a
requirement for subrogation.
1 Jesis-Maria Silva Shnchez, De nuevo, elperd6n[Again, a
pardon], 4 INDRET PENAL 1, 1-2 (2011), www.indret.com/pdf/
editorial.2_4.pdf.

6' FEUERBACH, Lehrbuch, supra note 49, at 122, note IV
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In exceptional scenarios, Jakobs establishes the possibility of using the pardon as a
practical remedy to such situations,7 2 expressly
following Kohlers thesis." Pardons could be
used as a mechanism whereby the implementation of strict enforcement of the sentence is
more flexible for state reconstruction, within
the framework of achieving internal peace in
critical environments. 4

-

In normal scenarios, Jakobs himself also
positively considers the possibility of using the
pardon mechanism, assuming it as an obstacle
to material punishment or as a complex mechanism. 5 Pardons could serve not only (procedurally) to avoid an inopportune process, but
also (legally-materially) to correct an erroneous
judicial decision - modifying the evidenced
fact or object examined in the proceedings
or to make an adjustment to a legal assessment
of the fact, which has been modified but not
yet been reflected in the appropriate retroactive legislative change - the fact or object was
correctly evidenced and remains intact, but a
change in the assessment of that fact has occurred. 6
Setting aside the first assumption related to the avoidance of an inopportune process,
an objective that would not be possible within most legal systems," the two possible uses
that Jakobs points out would be reduced to
these purposes: the correction of errors made

by the judicial body and the adjustment to the
new legal assessment that corresponds to the
fact-which will remain unchanged- (the solution to the temporary lack of adaptation that
was pointed out earlier and indicated by Feuerbach).
In turn, Dimoulis divides the potential
use of pardons into two scenarios: the normal
scenario and a scenario that he characterizes as
exceptional, or as a state or situation of emergency linked to political changes that have occurred in a society. 8
When analyzing the normal scenarios,
Dimoulis observes that pardons can serve as a
mechanism to achieve the aims of positive general prevention 9, although he announces, from
the start of his theoretical constructions, that
other resources or alternatives to replace it in
terms of the said purpose can be found without
any problems.o
These are cases in which pardon is recognized and used as a means to repair the errors
of justice (which are still human, ergo fallible)
in order to achieve materialjustice." This mechanism, as an "safety valve", would be aimed at
See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 465-72.
* The said author, starts from the idea pointed out by BERNARDO JOSE FEIJoo SANCHEZ, LA PENA COMO INSTITUCION JURIDICA: RETRIBUCION Y PREVENCION GENERAL [PENALTY AS A LEGAL

68-74 (Karsten Schmidt ed.,
1990).
* See Jakobs, supra note 72, at 345 n.41.

311
(2014), that in certain cases in which pardon is granted, for
example, because the penalty imposed is unjust, if instead of
granting pardon the sentence was served, that unjust exigence
of the punishment weakens the purpose of positive general
prevention. It reduces it to the extent that it would contradict
the commitment to present criminal proceedings as necessary
and just and, at the same time, damages trust in institutions,
denying the legitimacy of the criminal law system by demonstrating both its rigidity and its dysfunctionality.
so See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 450-5 1,
602-04.

1

1

See

GUNTHER JAKOBS, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEL: DIE

GRUNDLAGEN UND DIE ZURECHNUNGSLEHRE [CRIMINAL LAW GEN-

5 (2nd ed. 1991).
1 Michael KOhler, Strafgesetz, Gnade und Politiknach
Rechtsbegriffen [Penal law, Grace and Politicsaccording to
legal concepts], in RECHTSDOGMATIK UND RECHTSPOLITIK [LEGAL
ERAL PART: THE FOUNDATIONS AND THE COURT]

DOGMATICS AND LEGAL POLICY]

6

1

Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Given that, within them, to grant an individual pardon, a

final guilty judgement is demanded.
Washington College of Law

KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FUR GESETZGEBUNG

UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [CRITICAL
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https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol4/iss6/2
16

DImITI DIMOULIS, Die Gnade als Symbol [Grace as a Sym-

bol], 81

Spring 2019

Q.

LETTER FOR LEGIS.

&

12

INSTITUTION: GENERAL COMPENSATION AND PREVENTION]

357, 357-59 (1998).
10

Carrasco: Epitaph for Pardon Based on the Purpose of Punishment
Criminal Law

Practitioner

a

providing a quick and effective response to the

for our analysis; (b) for the symbolic function

criminal system's legitimacy crisis within the

assigned to the institution; and (c) because, in

framework of sentencing, without it being nec-

crisis situations, exceptional scenarios, it is a

essary to resort to reforming the

system.8 2

In these scenarios, pardons would not
only have a direct function but a symbolic-liberating effect in which it publicly demonstrates

that the criminal law system corrects its own
deficiencies and has the necessary capacity to
adapt in situations of crisis." The key to granting pardons would not, therefore, be rooted in
the error contained in a specific judgement,
but on the lack of necessity in terms of positive general prevention. Thus, pardons would
become a positive instrument to legitimize the
criminal system.
However, once these conclusions are
reached, Dimoulis himself recognizes that, if
the institution were to be conceptually abolished by a rationalization of the criminal system, structural deficiencies would not appear. 6
There would be no insurmountable obstacles
to its elimination. However, and despite reiterating that its abolition would not find insuperable impediments 7 , he states that pardons

will not disappear for three reasons: (a) because
the executive branch would never want to lose

unique mechanism.8

9

In relation to the symbolic function (b),
the said author concludes that the fact that
this task can be assigned to the institution of
pardon, related to the guarantee of satisfying
material justice which allows people to trust
the system, does not imply that this institution

has to be simply accepted and that it has to be
acknowledged as eternal. 90 Insofar as it is rep-

resented as a last illusion (letzte Taiuschung) of
an imaginary guarantee of the justice of punishment (which materializes in a few cases), resorting to pardon can be overcome by creating
other forms of conflict resolution in the system. 91 Pardons are surpassed once again; this
time, from the perspective of positive general
prevention.
C2.3. Pardonsandspecialpreventiontheories
Within the special prevention theories,
pardons would have been accepted naturally, 92 between all of the institutions which made
enforcing the punishment more flexible (suspending the sentence, replacing punishments,

its traditional power" - an irrelevant argument

82

a
1

Id. at 368.
See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 450-52.
Id. at 451.

3d ed. 2016); LINDE PANIAGUA, AmNiSTIA, supra note 65, at
70-71.
89
DIMOULIS, Du BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 603.
9o Dimoulis, Die Gnade, supra note 81, at 365-366; DIMouLIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 604.
1 DIMOULIS, Du BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 604.
9
The reasons why pardons would have fit so naturally are
based on the centrality of the offender's personal circumstances in the construction of the special prevention theories; and
in the fact that precisely in the phase of enforcement of the
sentence, the only phase in which the post-sententiam pardon
can appear is in that which the reasons of special prevention
are projected or have to be taken into consideration, even if
a monist theory on special prevention is not defended. Claus

a DIMOULIS, Die Gnade, supra note 81, 363-68 (1998).
86 See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 602.
But see, Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential
Administration of CriminalLaw, 90 N.YU. L. REV. 802, 802,
807-808, 832-861, 869 (2015); Rachel E. Barkow & Mark
Osler, RestructuringClemency: The Cost ofIgnoring Clemency and a Planfor Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2, 5, 17, 18,
26 (2015).
a See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 603.
8
Manuel Fanega, El Indulto: Anclisis yAlternativasBajo el
Roxin, Sentido y limites de la pena estatal [Meaning and LimPrisma Criminol6gico[The Pardon:Analysis andAlternatives
its ofState Punishment],in PROBLEMAS BASICOS DEL DERECHO
Under the CriminologicalPrism], in CRIMINOLOGiA Y JUSTICIA
PENAL [Basic Problems of Criminal Law] 31-32 (Diego-Manu[CRIMINOLOGY & JUSTICE] 114 (Guillermo Gonzhlez et al. eds.,
el Luz6n Pefia trans., 1976).
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the conditional sentence, parole, or the reduction or remission of the sentence).
In view of the above, it is not at all surprising that Von Liszt, who was considered the
founder of these theories, came to defend the
use of the pardon.9 3 However, and this point
is fundamental, among the functions that he
assigns to pardons, no special prevention objectives are mentioned.9 4 The said author states
that a decision that does not give the convict
any control in terms of obtaining his anticipated release, a measure over which he has no
influence on and does not provide him with
any certainties, is of no use for his resocialization. For this reason, he would defend, instead
of pardon, an indeterminate sentence or, as he
preferred to call it, a suspended sentence. 9 5
" Von Liszt identifies three justifications for pardons: (i) as
a self-correction of justice, as a safety valve, with which it is
possible to reconcile the rigid generalization of the law with
the demands of material justice; (ii) to improve judicial errors,
whether true-confinned or presumptive; and (iii) to help the
triumph of state intelligence or politics, at the expense of the
Law. FRANZ VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS
[TEXTBOOK OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW] 268-69 (10th ed.
1900); FRANZ VON LISZT

&

EBERHARD SCHMIDT, LEHRBUCH DES

DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS [TEXTBOOK OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW]

a) Negative special prevention theories
From a negative perspective, focused on
the protection of society against the offender,
it would seem apriorithat a pardon would not
fit, as it entails releasing from prison those who
still have to be neutralized and kept away from
the community. However, as Freeman 9 6 states
with regard to amnesty, the other form of state
pardon, a pardon may be conditioned. Therefore, measures may be established that aim to
achieve this incapacitation of the offender in
the first place, to achieve the protection of society on a secondary level.
Although these constructions do not
determine which criteria positively guide the
granting of a pardon or its grounds, instead
they are centered on protecting the innocuous purpose related to granting pardons, they
cannot be marginalized, insofar as they suggest
considering the conditioning of the pardon as
a functional equivalent to applying the punishment. Note that this conditioning is an essential element of parole and therefore, the practical likeness of this institution for that purpose
could be stated. 97

440 (26th ed. 1932).
Bedingte Verurteilung und bedingte
Begnadigung [ConditionalCondemnation and Conditional
Pardon], in 3 VERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN
"

b) Positive special prevention theories

FRANZ VON LISZT,

UND AUSLANDISCHEN STRAFRECHTS: VORARBEITEN ZUR DEUTSCHEN
STRAFRECHSREFORM, ALLGEMEINER TEIL

[COMPARATIVE

PRESEN-

TATION OF GERMAN AND FOREIGN CRIMINAL LAW: PREPARATIONS
FOR THE GERMAN CRIMINAL RENEWAL, GENERAL PART]

58-59

(Karl Birkmeyer et al. eds., 1908); Franz von Liszt, Welche

From the perspective of positive special
prevention constructions, however, there would
be reasons to justify resorting to pardons to
achieve the convict's reinsertion into society.
These are based on two types of arguments.

Mafiregeln konnen dem Gesetzgeber zur Einschrcinkungder
kurzzeitigen Freiheitsstrafeempfohlen werden? [What measures can be recommended to the legislatureto limit shortterm imprisonment?], 1 MITTEILUNGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN
KRIMINALISTISCHEN VEREINIGUNG [COMM. OF THE INT'L

CRIM.

Ass'N] 51 (1889); Franz von Liszt, KriminalpolitischeAufgaben [I] [CriminalPolicy Tasks [I]], 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE
GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [J. OF ALL CRIM. ScI.] 452,
495 (1889); Franz von Liszt, KriminalpolitischeAufgaben[If]
[CriminalPolicy Tasks [II]], 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [J. OF ALL CRiM. SC.] 737, 781-82 (1889).
95 von Liszt, Welche Ma/isregeln, supra note 94, at 44;
von Liszt, KriminalpolitischeAufgaben II, supra note 94, at
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol4/iss6/2
18
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755-76.

supra note 50, at 22.

96

FREEMAN,

1

Gimeno G6mez, La graciade indulto [The grace ofpar-

don], 4 REVISTA

DE DERECHO PROCESAL IBEROAMERICANA [MAG.

PROCEDURAL L. IBEROAMERICANA]

899, 925 (1972); Amadeo

Pineda, Derecho de gracia o indulto [Right of Grace or Pardon], in 11 IURIS: ACTUALIDAD Y PRACTICA DEL DERECHO [JURIS:
ACTUALITY & PRACTICE OF LAW] 34, 36-38 (1997).
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i) In exceptional cases, those identified
as transitional contexts, the defenders of these theories expressly and

A) The first subgroup includes those
grounds that defend the use of the
institution of pardon when the resocialization that the penalty intended to achieve has already been realized and the remaining sentence to
be served becomes superfluous and
even harmful9 8 ; or when the re-education of the offender no longer
needs to be verified in prison. 99

unanimously accept resorting to pardons (either by using the state intelligence idea employed by Von Liszt 0 2
or by using Merkel 0 3 or Bacigalupo
Zapater's104 idea on the predominant
general political interests or limiting
their use to certain crimes -politicalas suggested by Ferrios

(B) Additionally, a second positive use

ii) Regarding normal scenarios, functions assigned to the pardon that have
been assumed or could be assumed
by other ordinary mechanisms of the
criminal system have been identified.
The transfer of functions to other
institutions and the overcoming of
pardons are both recognized and assumed by the defenders of preventive-special postulates.

An analysis of the arguments used by
the defenders of positive special prevention
theories in relation to the limits of the pardon's
use, shows the following:

In normal scenarios, the justifications
given to pardons can be divided into two subgroups: those related to the accomplishment of
the punishment's purpose - the resocialization
of the convicted person - and those not specifically related to the achievement of that purpose

'

for pardons can be found, as an autonomous mechanism incentivizing
the convicted person and giving him
hope, by rewarding him if he succeeds in achieving the penalty's objective: his resocialization. 00 Pardons
are configured as a supreme reward
in response to the offender's excellent behavior, which signifies that the
purpose has been achieved.' 0

DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at
LINDE PANIAGUA, AmNiSTA, supra note 65, at 73.
98

"

343 45;

ENRICO FERRI, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTO CRIMINALE [PRINCIPLES OF

CRIMINAL LAW]

179-80 (1928) (basing argument on positivist

ideas). However, Ferri himself, who showed his reluctance
regarding the employment of the institution, admitted that pardons would have been surpassed by the conditional sentence
and parole (which would serve to undertake a periodic review
of judgements and take into account the convicted person's
meritorious behavior, having a jurisdictional guarantee that the
pardon didn't have).
100 Miguel Ruiz Mufioz, A prop6sito de la politica de clemencia en Derecho de la Competencia [About the clemency policy
in Competition Law], ALMACtN DE DERECHO [LAW MAG.],
Sept. 6, 2016, https://almacendederecho.org/perdon-unos-panales/ (basing this analysis on competitive law).
101 Margaret Colgate Love, FearofForgiving: Rule and
Discretion in the Theory and Practice ofPardoning, 13 FED.
SENT'G REP., 125 (2000-2001); David A. Shaw, Clemency: A
Useful Rehabilitation Tool, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1975, at 32.

(such as serving as a correction mechanism
when faced with a dysfunctional application of
a general law to a particular case, as a temporary adjustment mechanism between social reality and a new legislation, and as a mechanism
to amend judicial errors).
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supra
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251 53 (Stuttgart,
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If the aim of the pardon is to adjust the
application of the general rule to the particularities of a specific case, it has already been
pointed out when dealing with absolute theories, that there are sufficient mechanisms to
achieve the necessary individualization without
the need to use the pardon.
If, as Ferri observed,1 0 6 the criminal punishment provokes a public outcry as a result of
a temporary imbalance (insofar as the current
legislation is more beneficial for the convicted
person, having been adopted after the judgement was delivered and which the convict is
now serving), nothing prevents, in accordance
with the current regulation, the review of the
judgements delivered under the previous and
more burdensome regime.
If the aim is to defend the pardon as a
mechanism for repairing judicial errors, as Von
Liszto' defended, in relation to the fundamental rights and freedoms involved, this mistake
must be corrected through the appeals system
set up for that purpose and, as a last procedural remedy, resort to judicial review (recursode
revision). If the established system is thought to
be insufficient, the solution will consist in the
reform of the existing review mechanisms.'o
In relation to the reasoning in support
of pardons based on arguments aimed at the
reinsertion of the individual, I anticipated its
division to distinguish between: those reasons
that are based on the early achievement of
resocialization, before the end (temporal) of the
punishment was reached; and those that focus
note

at

106 FERRI, supra
99,
178-79.
107 VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS,

supra

note 93, at 268.
10s See, e.g., L.E. CRIM. (B.O.E. 1882, 260) (Spain). This was
also the case with Royal Decree 41/2015, of October 6, on the
modification of the Procedure Criminal Law for the acceleration of criminal justice and the strengthening of procedural
guarantees. (B.O.E. 2015, 239).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol4/iss6/2
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on the pardon as a reward or incentive for the
convict.
In the first subgroup, the constructions
have to be distinguished according to the temporal stage in which the offender's resocialization was achieved in relation to the enforcement
of the sentence. In a scenario where resocialization has been completed before the sentence has been enforced, due to the excessive
lapse of time between the acts (not prescribed)
and the sentence, there would no longer be a
need for the subject to verify his re-education
in prison. In these cases, the judgement may or
may not have been delivered. When delivering
the judgement, the sentencing court has: i) the
mitigating circumstance of undue delay at his
disposal (CP Article 21.6); ii) the closing clause
set forth in CP Article 21.7; (iii) the general
rules that allow for its adjustment depending
on the offender's personal circumstances (CP
Article 66); or iv), if the requirements are met,
the suspended sentence (CP Articles 80 et seq.).
If social reinsertion had been achieved
after the judgement declaring an imprisonment sentence was delivered, two scenarios
should be distinguished: one in which the enforcement of the sentence has not yet begun
and the one in which said reintegration materializes during the sentence.
In the first of the scenarios described,
Bacigalupo Zapater advocates for the use of
pardons in cases where the convicted person
has completed his or her social reintegration in
the time between the commission of the criminal act and the enforcement of the sentence
imposed.' 09 However, I believe that nothing
would prevent the reform of Article 80 CP in
this sense, if it can be deemed necessary to ex-

"0
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supra note 69, at 25.
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tend and expand those cases where imprisonment may be suspended.
On the other hand, if the offender's
resocialization takes place during his imprisonment, once the offender is inside the penal
institution and before the end of the sentence
being served, it is not necessary to resort to
pardons. Merkel" 0 , a defender of this particular argument, pointed out that institutions such
as parole would have displaced it. Additionally,
the Spanish prison system, based on the individualization of treatment and the various security categories that allow the regime to be
adjusted to the preventive-special needs of the
subject (including the advancement of parole
as a prison benefit), would perfectly satisfy the
function assigned to pardons.
Finally, if the purpose is to use pardons
as an incentive or reward to achieve the offender's resocialization with the aim of establishing
it as a maximum prison benefit, it should be
specified that according to Article 25 of the
Spanish Constitution, the said purpose should
not be understood as an exception but should
be applied to all the punishments to be served.
In the second of the scenarios described,
the existing prison regulation positively values
the offender's good behavior, allowing for the
individualized enforcement of punishments in
which the possibility of advancing parole is provided as a prison benefit, whose regime could
be legally extended, if deemed necessary. Therefore, also in this area, pardons have been surpassed by institutions subject to predetermined
requirements, endowed with greater guarantees
and which are, in practice, less disturbing for the
convicted subject' and society itself
supra note 103, at 251.
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In short, those who have approached
the study of the pardon assuming the starting hypotheses of special prevention have realized that, actually, this institution has lost its
importance in favor of other mechanisms.112
These instruments would impact not only at
the time of determining the penalty to be applied to the subject but, also the terms in which
the punishment that is finally imposed must be
achieved. I refer to the introduction of mitigating circumstances ex lege, to the incorporation
of ranges in relation to the penological limits
associated with the definition of crimes," 3 to
the suspended sentence," 4 its replacement by

alternative penalties, conditional reduction, parole,115 or the system of individualization of the
enforcement of the punishment." 6
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In this regard, in relation to parole
(similar, in its nature, to a prisoners subjective
right)," its indissolubility regarding the enforcement of the sentence has been pointed
out, given that it would soften the potentially
inflexible rigidity, improving legal guidelines
and allowing "to put an end to suffering, which
when it is not necessary, is unjust. "" This also
makes the pardon obsolete and outdated from
this perspective." 9

and reforms of the system whose deficiencies

were intended to be corrected through that institution: a more correct statutory definition of
punishable acts and their legal consequences;
an adequate application of the law by the judges
and the provision of a more complete appeals
system (including a potential improvement of
the judicial review regime recurso de revision-);
or specific institutions provided for in the law
(parole). Perhaps this effect on the inexorable

overcoming of pardons would precisely explain

D.

the sharp decrease in the number of pardons
granted in Spain in the last ten years.121

CONCLUSIONS

According to the distinction assumed at
the beginning of this article between the normal scenarios and transitional contexts, the
study of the arguments aiming to support the
use of pardon by the diverse theories of justification of punishment reveals a dichotomous
solution.
In the transitional contexts, there is consensus among academic opinion that pardons
can be seen as an irreplaceable tool to make the
enforcement of punishment flexible in order to
achieve social peace and harmony within the
so-called toolbox of transitional justice.1 2 0
However, in normal scenarios, pardons
have been surpassed by other institutions that
have absorbed the functions that were historically assigned to it. That means that the uses
that in practice had been granted to pardons
are met through the opportune corrections
"I Maria del Puerto Solar Calvo, La libertadcondicional
antipenitenciaria[The anti-prisonprobation],8873 DIARIo

LA

11

CADALSo,

11 DIMOULIS, Die Gnade, supra note 81, at 354.
120 JAVIER CHINCHON ALVAREZ, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y TRANSICIONES A LA DEMOCRACIA Y LA PAZ [INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

458-65, 522 (2007). A
different question, which goes beyond the limits of this analysis, is the material scope that such a pardon must have and the
body that must grant it.
TRANSITIONS To DEMOCRACY AND PEACE]
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In 2017, 26 pardons were granted; in 2018 (until April
8) that figure dropped to 9, which contrasts with the average
of 311 that Spain granted over the previous 10 years. Eva
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those convicted of corruption], PUBLICO, Apr. 9, 2018, https://
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